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The Jurisdictional Bar Provision:
Who is an Appropriate Relator?
Carolyn V. Metnick, J.D., LL.M

I. INTRODUCTION

Health care is a distinctive industry in the United States because the state
and federal governments incur a substantial portion of consumer costs. In
2006 the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services ("HHS") operated
on a budget of approximately $660 billion of which $565 billion was set
aside for Medicare and Medicaid related reimbursement.' In 2007, $597
billion of HHS's $696 billion budget was allocated for Medicare and
Medicaid related reimbursement. 2 Because of the U.S. Government's direct
and substantial financial interest in the healthcare industry, it is naturally
mindful of reducing economic losses. The greatest sources of economic
loss for some time have been fraud and abuse.3
In recent years, great strides have been made in combating fraud and
abuse and in trimming losses. For example, in 2007, through settlements
and judgments, the Department of Justice recovered $2 billion for the4
federal government of which $1.54 billion was from health care cases.
Additionally, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA") established the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control

* Carolyn V. Metnick is an attorney in the Chicago office of Barnes & Thornburg LLP,
where she practices healthcare law. Ms. Metnick received her LL.M. in health law from
Loyola University Chicago in 2007. She obtained her J.D. from Santa Clara University and
her B.A. from the University of Chicago.

1. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BUDGET IN BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2006,
ADVANCING THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WELL-BEING OF OUR PEOPLE 1, 8 (2006), available

at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/06budget/FY2006BudgetinBrief.pdf.
2. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BUDGET IN BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2007,
ADVANCING THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND WELL-BEING OF OUR PEOPLE 4, 12 (2007), available

at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/07budget/2007BudgetInBrief.pdf
3. Marilyn Hanzal, Understanding the Need for a Corporate Compliance Program, in
THE RISK MANAGER'S DESK REFERENCE 107, 107 (Barbara J. Youngberg ed., Aspen 1998).
4. Health Care Cases Account for Bulk of FederalRecoveries in 2007, DOJ Says, 16
BNA'S HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT 1338, Nov. 8, 2007.
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Program ("HCFAC").5 Since HCFAC's organization in 1997, $8.85 billion
has been returned to the federal government's healthcare budget.6 Although
the government continues to make progress in fighting fraud and abuse,
future success depends on the continuous identification of novel and
complex forms of illegal action, the prosecution of these actions, and the
adoption of preventative measures by healthcare entities. Success will also
depend on a steady stream of qui tam recoveries: actions brought on the
government's behalf by private individuals against perpetrators of fraud and
abuse.
Qui tam recoveries constitute a significant portion of the money restored
to the government. 7 Qui tam provisions allow "private actors to act as
attorneys general and pursue cases of alleged fraud.",8 In 2005 alone, the
federal government recovered $1.4 billion through False Claims Act
("FCA") qui tam litigation of which approximately eighty percent resulted
from healthcare fraud. 9 It is estimated that from 1986 to 2005, the United
States has recovered more than $9.6 billion from FCA qui tam litigation. 0
The recovery numbers continue to grow and there is little reason to expect
this growth to subside." In an effort to leverage these successes, the
government has promoted fraud awareness that encourages qui tam
lawsuits; the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act now requests that companies
billing Medicaid more than $5 million annually develop a policy to inform
their employees of policies
and procedures used by the organization to
2
abuse.'
and
fraud
detect
Given the increasing importance of qui tam litigation in fighting fraud
and abuse and the generous rewards bestowed upon successful relators, 3 it
is crucial that FCA qui tam litigants understand the common and
contentious statutory pitfall: the jurisdictional bar provision.' 4 In general,
the jurisdictional bar provision places exacting yet ambiguous conditions on
5.

HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS. AND THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2005 1 (2006), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2005.pdf.

6.

Id.

7. Judith A. Thorn, Most Recoveries from Qui Tam Actions Come from Health Care
Industry, DOJSays, 10 BNA'S HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT 702, 702 (2006).
8. Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic
Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REv. 455, 456 (1998).
9.
Thorn, supra note 7, at 702.
10. Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 456.
11.
See Thorn, supra note 7, at 702.
12. Robert Pear, At Hospitals, Lessons in Detection of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2006, at A14.
13.
In this article, a "relator," sometimes known as a whistleblower, is an interested
person who brings the action on behalf of the government.
14. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730 (e)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).
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a litigant's ability to bring a qui tam claim before a court. Moreover, the
ability to satisfy this standard varies based on each jurisdiction's
interpretation of the FCA. As a result, the evaluation of a potential case
requires a thorough investigation of the facts as well as an analysis of the
applicable jurisdictional law where a case will be filed. In some
circumstances where a large, national healthcare entity is involved, multiple
courts may have jurisdiction and venue to hear a given case. A relator or
his attorney should determine which court will view his case most favorably
based on the governing law and procedure of the various jurisdictions.
Specifically, a relator should consider each jurisdiction's interpretation
of the FCA and its respective analysis of the jurisdictional bar provision.
The jurisdictional bar provision of the FCA prevents an action from
proceeding if it is "based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions" in a hearing or other specified venue or source, unless the
relator is the original source of the information.1 5 A thorough evaluation of
the law of all applicable jurisdictions prior to filing will help the relator
choose the most favorable jurisdiction and increase the likelihood of a
successful qui tam action.
For example, in the Third Circuit, it is difficult for a relator to avoid
falling victim to the jurisdictional bar provision. 16 The Third Circuit
interprets several elements in the jurisdictional bar provision broadly,17
increasing the chance that a relator's action will be jurisdictionally barred.
Similarly, in the Tenth Circuit, it is difficult for a relator to qualify as an
"original source," which is required for a court to have jurisdiction if
18
allegations or transactions have been publicly disclosed.
However, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits tend to favor relators. 19 The Ninth
and D.C. Circuits interpret elements of the jurisdictional bar provision
narrowly, thereby limiting the chance that the jurisdictional bar provision
will be invoked. 20 Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit broadly interprets the
"original source" requirement such that if the public disclosure prong of the
jurisdictional bar provision is not satisfied, it will be easier for a relator to

15. Id.
16. See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth., 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir.
1999); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir.
1992).
17. See Mistick PBT, 186 F.3d 376.
18. See Precision Co., 971 F.2d 548.
19. See United States ex rel. Found. Aiding the Elderly v. Horizon West Inc., 265 F.3d
1011 (9th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d
645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
20. See Found.Aiding the Elderly, 265 F.3d 1011; Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d
645.
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prove1 that he or she is the "original source," avoiding the jurisdictional
2
bar.
This article provides an introduction to the FCA and its legislative
history with a focus on the variety of existing interpretations of the
jurisdictional bar provision. For clarity, the jurisdictional bar provision has
been broken down into its two constituent parts: the general exclusion and
the original source exception, each with its own conditions.
The general exclusion of the jurisdictional bar provision provides that a
relator may not bring an action if the information, on which he bases his
claim has been publicly disclosed prior to the relator's filing. This article
explores the general exclusion by analyzing applicable circuit court
decisions interpreting the exclusion's key conditions: "public disclosure"
and "based upon."
The jurisdictional bar provision also contains an exception that a relator
may bring an action even if the information forming the basis of the claim
was previously publicly disclosed, provided the relator was the original
source of such information. Applicable circuit decisions are examined
herein with particular regard to judicial interpretations of "original source."
An analysis of the circuit court decisions demonstrates that the circuits
are split regarding the interpretation of the jurisdictional bar provision of
the FCA. This is significant because an action filed in one circuit may
result in a successful resolution for the relator while the same action filed in
a different circuit may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rockwell International
Corp. v. United States provides clarity on the "information on which
allegations are based" condition of the original source exception under the
jurisdictional bar provision, a number of other conditions of both the
general exclusion and the original source exception to the jurisdictional bar
provision remain unclear.2 2 This article concludes that Congress should
revisit the jurisdictional bar provision of the FCA and amend its language to
reflect the provision's purpose in order to offer greater guidance, thereby
preventing divergent interpretations of the FCA.
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
While the number of qui tam fraud and abuse actions has escalated in
recent years, such problems are not novel, and qui tam provisions have
provided statutory solutions for some time. "Qui tam" is an abbreviation

21. See United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d
562 (11 th Cir. 1994).
22. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1400 (2007).
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for "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipso," which translates from
Latin to "he who as much for the king as for himself."
A. Legislative History of the False Claims Act
Qui tam actions first arose under English common law in the thirteenth century:
... [T]he qui tam suit became a popular means of forum shopping.
Private parties could receive relief for their injuries by bringing a suit in
the King's name and attaining access to the royal courts. In doing so,
they could avoid ineffective and unjust local courts. Informers, or
persons lacking personal injury, could also bring qui tam actions in the
King's name and receive part of the penalty imposed on the wrongdoer.
Statutes eventually replaced these common law actions, but the qui tam
suit became
less popular as England developed an effective public police
23
force.
In the United States, the earliest federal anti-fraud law was the
Informer's Act, the precursor to the FCA. The Informer's Act was
established during the Civil War to combat fraud perpetrated by merchants
who sold supplies to the Union Army. Supported by President Abraham
Lincoln and passed by Congress in 1863, the Informers Act prosecuted
those who contracted to sell specific items to the government but instead
intentionally delivered worthless goods.24 The Civil War period was replete
with such instances of fraudulent trading. "[F]or sugar [the government]
often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, something no better than brown
paper; for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts and dying donkeys; and
for serviceable muskets and pistols, the experimental failures of sanguine
,,25
a hs
To combat these
inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armories.
occurrences, the Informer's Act included a qui tam provision that allowed
private citizens to bring suit on the government's behalf against individuals
or companies who were defrauding the government.2 6
Congress drafted the Act broadly so that it applied to all types of fraud on
the government. The Act required a $2000 penalty for each false claim
by a government contractor and double damages. A private qui tam

23.
24.

Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 458.
Phillips & Cohen LLP, History of the Law, http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/

CM/FalseClaimsAct/histjf.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).

25. Construction and Application of "Public Disclosure" and "Original Source"
JurisdictionalBars Under 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4) (Civil Actions for False Claims), 117
A.L.R. FED 263 (1994) (citing FRED SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865, 58 (Reprint Services Company 1965), available at
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=23414435#).

26.

Id.
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relator could bring an action on behalf of the government and receive
fifty percent of the damages and forfeitures. Once the relator filed suit,
the government did not have a right to take over
the action; however, the
27
relator had to bear the cost of pursuing the suit.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Informer's Act (renamed the FCA) in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess
permitted an informer (relator) to bring a qui tam False Claims action based
on public information. 28 In Hess the public information was a previous
criminal indictment. 29 The Court reasoned that although the plaintiff did
not contribute new information to the investigation, the FCA did not require
a qui tam plaintiff to aid in the discovery of fraud.3 ° Indeed, the ruling
"permitted relators to copy criminal indictments into their civil actions and
request half of any civil judgment. Thus, qui tam plaintiffs could receive
fifty percent of the government's recovery without aiding in the fight to
31
uncover fraud.,

Within months of Hess, Congress amended the FCA to bar courts from
having jurisdiction over any suit based on information or evidence already
possessed by the government. The 1943 "amendments included other
provisions unfriendly to qui tam relators and resulted in fewer qui tam
actions brought under the Act [FCA]. ',32 Nonetheless, the amendments
proved too restrictive in 1984 when the Seventh Circuit denied jurisdiction
in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean.33 In Dean, the State of
Wisconsin had been the source of the government's information concerning
fraud, yet the court denied Wisconsin jurisdiction as a relator, stating that
its qui tam action was based upon evidence already in possession of the
United States. 34 To lawyers and legislators, this result seemed unjust as
Wisconsin had been the source of the information and had been required to
inform the federal government of the fraud allegations as part of its
participation in the Medicare reimbursement program.

35

In reaction to Dean, and mounting inundation with fraud related issues,
Congress again amended the FCA to encourage private enforcement.
Moreover, Congress sought to mitigate the restrictive effect of the 1943
amendments and to expand the availability of qui tam actions without

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 459.
United States ex rel.Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
Id.
Id.
Meador & Warren, supra note 8, at 459.
Id. at 460.
United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
Idat 1106.
S. REp. No. 99-345, at 13, as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278.
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restoring the opportunity to bring the sort of "copy-cat" qui tam suits
permitted under Hess.36
As such, the 1986 amendments "provided
incentives for private enforcement, including increased monetary
awards,... a lower burden of proof, and allow[ing] the qui tam plaintiff to
remain a party in the action even if the Government intervenes. 37 The
original source exception was also created as part of these amendments.
B. ProceduralIssues Related to Qui Tam Filings
The statutory language of the FCA has remained essentially unchanged
since the 1986 amendments. Since those revisions, qui tam filings and
recoveries have been on the rise. Prior to filing a qui tam suit, a relator
must tender a copy of the complaint and all material information and
evidence within his possession to the government in the form of a written
disclosure.38 The primary purpose of the written disclosure "is to provide
the United States with enough information on the alleged fraud to be able to
make a well reasoned decision on whether it should participate in the filed
lawsuit, or allow the relator to proceed alone., 39 The complaint is then
sealed for sixty days or more for the government to determine whether it
will intervene.40 Should the government decide not to intervene during the
41
sixty days, it may still join later if it demonstrates "good cause.,
C. The JurisdictionalBar Provision
The FCA's jurisdictional bar provision includes both a general exclusion
for publicly disclosed information as well as an exception to that rule where
the qui tam plaintiff was the original source of the information.42 Perhaps
the most litigated part of the FCA, the jurisdictional bar provision sets forth
specific conditions under both the general exclusion and the original source
exception.
The jurisdictional bar provision was added to the FCA
following United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 43 in 1943 and was rewritten
in 1986 after Wisconsin was dismissed as a qui tam plaintiff in United
36.

Id.

37.

United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins.

Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2000).
39. Joel M. Androphy & Mark A. Correro, FederalQui Tam (False Claims) Litigation:
The Government's Watchdog, 42 Hous. LAW. 18, 19 (Feb. 2005) (quoting United States ex
rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc., 797 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986)).

40.
41.
42.

Id. at 19-20.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2000).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).

43. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 1991).
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States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean.4 The current jurisdictional bar provision
provides that:
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit,
or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before
45 filing an action under this section which is based
on the information.
Courts have suggested that the jurisdictional bar provision has two basic
goals: "(1) to encourage private citizens with first-hand knowledge to
expose fraud; and (2) to avoid civil actions by opportunists attempting to
capitalize on public information without seriously contributing to the
' 46
disclosure of the fraud.

In a qui tam action, the relator has the burden of demonstrating that a
court has jurisdiction over the case.4 7 In deciding whether it has
jurisdiction, a court must determine whether the allegations underlying the
action have been previously disclosed to the public. 8 If the court finds the
allegations have been previously disclosed in public, triggering the general
exclusion, it must determine whether the relator was the "original source"
of the information.4 9 If the relator was the original source of the
information, the relator may continue with the suit despite the public
disclosure under the original source exception. 50 However, if the relator
was not the original source, he may not bring the action as a qui tam

44. Id.at 1153-54 (citing S. REP. No. 99-345, at 13, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5278).
45. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000).
46. United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir.
1992) (citing Prudential,944 F.2d at 1154).
47. United States ex rel. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sci., No. 90-2568, 1992 WL 247587,
at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1992) (citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'I Transit Auth., 895
F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)).
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
49. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2000).
50. Id.
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plaintiff.5' In order for an action to continue under the latter scenario, a
state's attorney general's office would have to intervene on the plaintiffs
behalf.52

The language of the FCA has posed interpretational problems for the
courts, counsel, and parties. The circuit court decisions, which greatly vary
in their interpretations of the jurisdictional bar provision, exemplify this.
Whether an individual will qualify as an appropriate relator or will be
barred from bringing a qui tam suit in an FCA action depends entirely on
the circuit in which the action is filed and how that circuit interprets each
condition of both the general exclusion and the original source exception.
III. THE GENERAL EXCLUSION

In determining whether an action is barred, a court will first consider
whether there has been public disclosure pursuant to section 3730(e)(4)(A)
of the United States Code:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action... based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or

administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General 3or the
person bringing the action is an originalsource of the information.
Legal experts have interpreted this language to mean that "[i]f the
information in the FCA suit has been publicly disclosed and the qui tam
54
plaintiff is not the original source of the information, the suit is barred.
To determine whether a public disclosure has been made by an individual
or entity, courts evaluate each of the four conditions placed on the general
exclusion of the jurisdictional bar provision: (1) public; (2) source; (3)
based upon; and (4) allegations or transactions.5 5
The circuit courts differ in their interpretation of each of these
conditions. In determining whether a disclosure is "public," courts have
interpreted "public" differently. 6 The phrase "based upon" has also been a
source of ambiguity for the circuits and has been interpreted differently

51.
52.
53.

Id.
31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(5).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).

54.
ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE § 4,
at 35 (ALM Media 2007) (1996).
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
56. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth., 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir.
1999); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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depending on the locale. Additionally, the expression "allegations or
transactions" has posed problems, leading some circuits to ignore this
language in the jurisdictional bar provision altogether. 57 Other circuits have
taken a strict approach, holding that the jurisdictional bar provision does not
apply to a5 8 disclosure that does not constitute an "allegation or
transaction.
In general, broad interpretations of the conditions in the general
exclusion correspond with courts precluding a greater range of cases under
the jurisdictional bar provision. Narrow interpretations of these conditions,
however, tend to favor relators because fewer cases will be barred. The
opposite is true for the original source exception. Broad interpretations of
the original source exception's conditions tend to favor qui tam plaintiffs
while narrow interpretations of these conditions tend to disfavor qui tam
plaintiffs. By employing various combinations of broad or narrow
interpretations of the general exclusion and the original source exception,
each circuit court has been able to finely hone the balance between
encouraging enforcement through qui tam litigation and discouraging
predatory qui tam suits by plaintiffs uninvolved in discovering the fraud.
Although the language of the jurisdictional bar provision has allowed courts
to carefully weigh these considerations, this approach has led to a
bewildering diversity of holdings across the different circuits.
A. Interpretationsof the "Public" Condition of the GeneralExclusion
Since Congress enacted the FCA, the meaning of the first condition,
"public," has been interpreted differently in the various circuit courts.5 9
In United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., the Second Circuit
considered the meaning of "public" within the jurisdictional bar provision.6 °
In Doe, federal investigators arrived at a corporate office with a search
warrant. 61 The government had received information from an informant
that the company, which performed services for the military under several
defense contracts, was defrauding the government.62 When the government
raided the corporate office, employees and several customers were
57. United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Me., 24 F.3d 320, 326 (1st
Cir. 1994).
58. United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill, Inc., 107 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 645.
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth., 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir.
1999); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
60. United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id.
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present. 63 As the federal investigators seized documents and data, they
informed the employees that they were investigating the company for
fraud.6 4
For the purposes of interpreting the jurisdictional bar provision, the
Second Circuit considered whether a public disclosure had occurred when
the federal investigators divulged the allegations of fraud to the observing
employees while the raid was in progress. 65 The Second Circuit held that
the disclosure was public, reasoning that the employees were members of
the public and had no obligation to keep the information confidential.66
Taking a broad approach to this condition, the court noted that there was no
significant distinction between company employees and outsiders as both
groups were members of the public.67
The Third Circuit analyzed the meaning of "public" in United States ex
rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Authority.68 In Mistick, a local construction
company filed a qui tam action against the Housing Authority of the City of
Pittsburgh ("HACP") and an architectural firm. 69 The qui tam complaint
alleged that the defendants made false claims to the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") regarding the cost
of work
70
involving lead-based paint abatement at HACP housing projects.
As of 1986, lead based paint abatement was required on all HUDassociated housing; one way to fulfill the requirement was to cover the
paint with an encapsulant to prevent lead exposure. 71 The architectural
specifications of the subject HACP housing projects called for the use of
Glid-Wall as the encapsulanti. 2 However, Glid-Wall was not a proper
encapsulant as reported by its manufacturer, Glidden.73 Although the
architect and HACP were aware of this information when the specifications
were submitted in 1989, they intended to use Glid-Wall and misrepresented
to HUD that it was an appropriate encapsulant.7 4 A year later, after
information surfaced regarding the misrepresentation, the architect had no
choice but to revise the specifications for the use of a proper encapsulant
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1999).
69.

Id.
Id. at 320.
Doe, 960 F.2d at 322.
Id. at 323
Id.
United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir.
Id. at 379.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.
73.

Id.
Mistick PBT, 186 F.3d at 379.

74.

Id.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2008

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 17

known as Zomat.7 5 HACP then sought an additional $750,000 from HUD
to fund the cost increase associated with Zomat's use.76 HACP informed
HUD that Glidden no longer recommended Glid-Wall as an encapsulant,
falsely implying that when the specifications were submitted to HUD,
Glidden had recommended Glid-Wall as an encapsulant.7 7
Eventually, Mistick, the general contractor for the HACP, sued HACP,
claiming damages due to the delay resulting from the change in the leadabatement specifications.78 Mistick sought information from HUD pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), and the documents produced
evidence of false claims regarding the Glid-Wall matter. 79 After obtaining
the FOIA documents, Mistick filed a qui tam action.8 °
The key issue presented to the Third Circuit in Mistick was whether the
FOIA response produced by HUD constituted a public disclosure under the
jurisdictional bar provision. 81 The court held that the FOIA response was a
public disclosure, reasoning that the information was accessible to members
of the public upon request.82
Information may be publicly disclosed- for example, it may appear
buried in an exhibit that is filed in court without fanfare in an obscure
case- and yet not be readily accessible to the general public. And
information may be easily accessible to the public- it may be available
under FOIA to anyone who simply files a request- but unless there has
been a request and the information is actually produced, it is not publicly
disclosed.
Thus, the court's decision suggests that although documentation and
information may be available to the public or potentially disclosed, there is
no public disclosure until that information is requested and produced.84 In
Mistick, when HUD produced the requested FOIA documents, the
information became "public" within the meaning of the jurisdictional bar
85
provision.
Despite the Third Circuit's narrow reading of the term "public" in the
jurisdictional bar provision, in United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Mistick PBT, 186 F.3d at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Mistick PBT, 186 F.3d at 383.
Id.
Id. at 384.
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& Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Insurance Co., the court broadly
construed the term "hearing" which appears in the same statutory
language.86 Pursuant to section 3730(e)(4)(A) of the United States Code,
the "public" condition of the general exclusion of qui tam actions is
dependent on whether allegations or transactions have been disclosed in a
"hearing," among other proceedings. 87 The Third Circuit held that
"hearing" is to be interpreted so as to include the discovery phase of
litigation.8 8 The dicta in Stinson have also been understood to mean that the
potential for disclosure will satisfy the public disclosure condition of the
jurisdictional bar provision, and that actual disclosure is unnecessary.89
In contrast, the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits will not invoke
the jurisdictional bar provision unless there has been actual public
disclosure. 90 The narrow interpretation of this condition of the general
exclusion applicable in these courts favors qui tam plaintiffs. In United
States v. Bank of Farmington, the Seventh Circuit took a position contrary
to that of the Third Circuit in Stinson: "We think, however, that the
reasoning of the Third Circuit is unsound. The interpretation of 'public
disclosure' adopted there runs contrary to the plain meaning of the
words." 91 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit opted for a strict interpretation
of "public," holding that discovery material, which has not been filed with
the court, has not been publicly disclosed. 92 Similarly, in United States ex
rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, the D.C. Circuit also took a
position differing from that of the Third Circuit.93 It held that discovery
material, which has actually been made public through filing with the court,
is "public" for the purposes of the jurisdictional bar provision.94
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit came to an opposite holding of the

86. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1157 (3d Cir. 1991).
87. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
88. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1156.
89. Id. at 1159 ("we look not to whether the specific documents must be or have been
filed but whether there is a recognition that they can be filed and hence available for public
access.").
90. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1519
(10th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1520
(9th Cir. 1995) vacated in part, 520 U.S. 939; United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166
F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn,
14 F.3d 645, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
91. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d at 860 (7th Cir. 1999).
92. Id.
93. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1158 (3d Cir. 1991).
94. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 653.
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Second Circuit in Doe.95 In United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., the Ninth Circuit held that disclosure to company employees,
who like the employees in Doe were also government defense contractors,
did not constitute "public" disclosure within the jurisdictional bar
96
provision.
We decline to adopt the rule of Doe for application in this circuit.
At one level, the Doe court's treatment of company employees as
members of the public is unrealistic. Unlike others who come
across information related to fraud, an "innocent employee who
comes forward with allegations of fraud by her employer knows
that her job may be in jeopardy." Doe, 960 F.2d at 325 (Walker,
J., dissenting). Because the employee has a strong economic
incentive to protect the information from outsiders, revelation of
information to an employee does not trigger the potential for
corrective action presented by other forms of disclosure. 97
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that treating employees as members of the
public to whom "public disclosure" can occur would defeat Congress's
intent for the FCA by allowing the government "to sit on, and possibly
suppress, allegations98of fraud when inaction might seem to be in the interest
of the government."
In United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century HealthcareCorp., the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Schumer, holding
that the potential for disclosure does not satisfy the jurisdictional bar
provision.9 9 Ramseyer concerned an Oklahoma Department of Human
Services ("DHS") report, known as the Hughes Report, that had been
prepared after DHS audited a mental health facility and uncovered fraud.10 0
Only three copies of this report were made. 01' The Hughes Report detailed
the facility's compliance problems and was kept by the defendants, DHS,
and a DHS administrator. 0 2 Moreover, the report was not released to the
general public and was only available to the public upon a written request

95. See Id. at 1519; United States ex re. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318 (2d Cir.
1992).
96. United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir.

1995).
97. Id. at 1518.
98.

Id. at 1519 (citing Doe, 960 F.2d at 323).

99. United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1519
(10th Cir. 1996).
100. Id. at 1517.
101.

Id.

102.

Id.
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10 3
for the specific record and with approval of the DHS legal department.
The court held that the mere placement of the Hughes Report in DHS' files
did not constitute public disclosure even if members of the public could
have obtained copies of the Hughes Report by request. 0 4 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that in order for a member of the public to request the Hughes
Report, he or she would have to know that DHS conducted an inspection in
1991 and that the documented findings were available to the public upon
request. 0 5 The court held that this called for too much speculation.106
Accordingly, the court ruled that in order to be publicly disclosed, the
allegations or transactions upon which a qui tam suit is based must have
been made07 known to the public through some affirmative act or
disclosure.1

B. Interpretationsof the "Source" Condition of the General Exclusion
The second condition on the general exclusion of the jurisdictional bar
provision is the "source" of the disclosure. As with much of the language
in the jurisdictional bar provision, there is considerable ambiguity. Section
3730(e)(4)(A) of the United States Code provides in part that:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, or
from the news media ....

Circuits differ over whether the suit will be barred if the source of the
disclosure is not explicitly listed in the statute. The exhaustive position
takes the view that if a source of the disclosure is not listed in the statute, a
court will not necessarily bar the suit. 10 9 Because the exhaustive approach
narrowly limits the sources of the public disclosure to the items listed in the
statute, circuits that endorse this approach should be regarded as favorable
to qui tam plaintiffs.
In United States ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, the Third Circuit
interpreted the list of sources in the jurisdictional bar provision as
exhaustive." 0 However, despite the fact that the Third Circuit takes the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Ramseyer, 90 F.3d. 1514 at 1521.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1517 (internal citations omitted).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).

Id.
United States ex rel.Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2005).
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narrow view towards classes listed in the jurisdictional bar provision, a
relator-friendly position, it interprets the term "hearing" broadly, thereby
expanding the applicability of the general exclusion and undercutting the
qui tam friendly tendencies of the exhaustive view on sources.'l
In Stinson, a case brought before the Third Circuit, the appellant argued
that the term "hearing" should be defined as "some sort of live, relatively
formal proceeding before a decisionmaking [sic] body, with question of law
or fact to be tried."' 2 However, the Third Circuit noted that it found the
plaintiffs theofy unpersuasive because this definition would exclude
information publicly disclosed in a criminal indictment, which was held
13
admissible by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.
"Only if the criminal 'hearing' to which the subsection (e)(4)(A) refers is
broad enough to cover the full range of proceedings in the course of civil,
criminal, or administrative litigation would the type of lawsuit represented
by Marcus and deemed parasitic by Congress be barred."' " 14 According to
the Third Circuit, "to qualify as a public disclosure under the FCA, a
disclosure must ...

issue from a source or occur in a context specifically

' 15
recognized by the Act." "
Likewise, in United States ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill,Inc., the Northern
District of California, which sits within the Ninth Circuit, came to the same
finding as the Third Circuit. 116 The Northern District of California opined
that public disclosure requires that the information originate in a forum
listed by the FCA, and that the context of the disclosure identify either the
allegations or the transactions alleged in the qui tam complaint."l 7 "If there
has been public disclosure through one of these sources, [the Court] must
then determine whether the content of the disclosure consisted of the
'allegations or transactions' giving rise to the relator's claim, as opposed to
'mere information.""' 18 Thus, the Northern District interprets the first
condition of the general exclusion of the jurisdictional bar provision
narrowly such that there is no "public disclosure" unless the disclosure is
specifically an allegation or transaction: a position favoring the relator.
The Hansen court also expressly adopted another related Third Circuit

111. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1157 (3d Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 1155.
113. Prudential,944 F.2d 1149 at 1155 (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 541 (1943)).
114. Id.
115. United States ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 2005).
116. United States ex rel. Hansen v. Cargill, Inc., 107 F. Supp.2d 1172, 1181 (N.D. Cal.,
2000).
117. Id. at 1177.
118. Id.
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117

holding in United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware; this case
holds that the second category of sources listed in the jurisdictional bar
documents produced by a non-federal government
provision precludes
11 9
source or agency.
[T]he phrase "administrative... report, hearing, audit or
investigation" in the second category of the FCA fora does not
include non-federal agency actions. To hold otherwise would lead
to the anomalous result that disclosure of a state administrative
report implicates the FCA jurisdictional bar while disclosure of a
state legislative report - a report which is neither congressional,
administrative or from the General Accounting Office- does not
raise the jurisdictional bar. 120
C. Interpretationsof the "Based Upon" Condition of the General Exclusion
Unsurprisingly, the circuits have also developed various interpretations
for the meaning of "based upon" as it is used in the general exclusion to the
jurisdictional bar provision. In United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe
Corp., the Second Circuit took a relator-friendly view, holding that claims
are "based upon" publicly disclosed allegations or transactions if they "are
the same as those that had been publicly disclosed prior to the filing of the
qui tam suit.''12 1 In United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
the Fourth Circuit also took a relator-friendly view of the "based upon"
language, holding that "based upon" means "derived from." 122 More
specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that "a relator's action is 'based upon' a
public disclosure of allegations only where the relator has actually derived
from that
disclosure the allegations upon which his qui tam action is
123
based.
We are unfamiliar with any usage, let alone a common one or a
dictionary definition, that suggests that "based upon" can mean
"supported by." Preferring the plain meaning of the words enacted
by Congress over our sister Circuits' as-yet unconsidered
assumptions as to the meaning of those words, and over the
Second Circuit's considered but unsupported interpretation, we
119. Id. at 1179-80 (citing United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123
F.3d 734 (3d Cir. 1997)).
120. Hansen, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1180 (referring to Dunleavy, 123 F.3d 734).
121. United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 1992).
122. United States ex rel. Siller v. Beckton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348-49
(4th Cir. 1994) (referring to United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d
548 (10th Cir. 1992)).
123. Id. at 1348.
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hold that Siller's action was "based upon" the disclosures in the
derived his allegations against BD
SSI lawsuit if Siller actually
24
from the SSI complaint.1
Under the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, "two identical suits could proceed
' 25
so long as each relator did not derive his or her claim from the other.'
The Eighth Circuit also addressed this issue in Minnesota Association of
Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp.126 The Minnesota
Association of Nurse Anesthetists ("Association") filed a qui tam action
against defendant hospitals and anesthesiologists, alleging that they had
mischaracterized services provided to Medicare patients to the U.S.
Government. 127 Specifically, the Association claimed that defendants'
violations fell into four categories: (1) billing on a reasonable charge basis
when the services provided did not meet reasonable charge criteria; (2)
billing for personally performed services when the services did not meet
personally performed criteria; (3) billing as if the anesthesiologist involved
were directing fewer concurrent cases than he or she actually was; and (4)
certifying that it was medically necessary for both an anesthesiologist and
an anesthetist to128personally perform cases routinely performed by an
anesthetist alone.
Seven weeks before filing the qui tam action, the Association sued many
of the same defendants for antitrust and state law violations connected with
billing practices.1 29 The antitrust complaint alleged that defendants were
engaged in the widespread practice of fraudulent billing for anesthesia,
including "billing for services not rendered, billing for operations at which
designating operations as one-onthey were not present, and inaccurately
130
one for Medicare purposes."'
One issue considered by the Eighth Circuit was whether the allegations
in the qui tam action were "based upon" public disclosure. 131 The Eighth
Circuit followed the approach of the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits,
by these circuits was more
concluding that the reading of section 3730(e)(4)
32
policy.1
intended
Congress'
with
consistent

124. Id. at 1349.
125. United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940
(6th Cir. 1997) (citing Siller, 21 F.3d 1339).
126. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032,
1036 (8th Cir. 2002).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1037.
129. Id. at 1040.
130. Id.
131. Minn. Ass'n ofNurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1043.
132. Id. at 1047.
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Congress's [sic] fairness concern is not effectuated by each part of the
statute read in isolation, but rather by the statute as a whole. The "based
upon" clause serves the concern of utility, that is of paying only for
useful information, and the "original source" exception serves the
concern of fairness, that is of not biting the hand that fed the government
information. If the "based upon" clause threatens to kick relators out of
court because the government does not need them, the "original source"
exception reopens the courthouse door for certain deserving relators.
Therefore, the majority view reaches the correct result, not because
Congress cared nothing for fairness and everything for utility, but
because it used two different provisions to strike a balance between these
concerns. 133

As such, the Eighth Circuit held that the allegations in the 34
qui tam action
were "based upon" the antitrust case and newspaper articles. 1
In United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc., the Tenth
Circuit held that a plaintiff whose qui tam action is based in any part upon
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions must be the original source of
the information in order to avoid being jurisdictionally barred.1 35 Precision
filed a qui tam action, alleging that the defendants understated the quantity
of crude oil and natural gas produced from federal and Indian lands to the
U.S. Government.' 36 The Tenth Circuit found that Precision's allegations
were "based upon" publicly disclosed allegations; therefore, Precision's qui
tam action was jurisdictionally barred. 137 In finding that Precision's
allegations had already been publicly disclosed, the court relied on the fact
that Precision's majority shareholder had raised allegations of crude oil
theft in three previously filed lawsuits. 138 The court also noted that
allegations of crude oil and natural gas theft had been disclosed during a
public hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and in
countless news releases. 39 As a result, the court took a restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "based upon," equating it with "supported by,"
reasoning that its interpretation
is consistent with the goals of the
40
jurisdictional bar provision. 1
The Tenth Circuit subsequently clarified the Precision finding in United
States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., explaining that a court "must
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 553 (10th
Cir. 1992).
136. Id. at 550.
137. Id. at 554.
138. Id. at 553.
139. Id. at 553-54.
140. Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 552-53.
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determine whether a 'substantial identity' exists between the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions and the qui tam complaint."' 4' Prior to
Fine, any qui tam action remotely based upon a public disclosure in the
Tenth Circuit would have been barred under the general exclusion of the
jurisdictional bar provision. However, Fine qualified this interpretation,
allowing actions to proceed that may be remotely based upon a public
disclosure, so long as the action and the public disclosure are not
substantially identical.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit adopted the position of the Tenth Circuit,
construing "based upon" to mean "supported by," thereby precluding
individuals "who base any part of their allegations on publicly disclosed
information" from bringing an action under the FCA.142 The Eleventh
Circuit followed suit, noting however that it does not give significant
weight to the "based upon" element of the jurisdictional bar provision and
instead emphasizes the "original source" inquiry as the focus of the
jurisdictional bar provision. 43 The court referred to the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Precision where the Precision court concluded the "based
is a "quick trigger to get to the more exacting original source
upon" test
' 44
inquiry."'

D. Interpretationsof the "'Allegationsor Transactions" Condition of the
General Exclusion
The fourth and final condition of the general exclusion of the
jurisdictional bar provision is "allegations or transactions." In some
circuits, a finding that information was publicly disclosed is insufficient to
end the inquiry, as the statute precludes actions "based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions."'145 The Second, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits interpret this phrase strictly, favoring the relator. However, the
First Circuit ignores the phrase altogether, focusing instead on whether the
purpose of the FCA will be served if the action is not impeded by the
jurisdictional bar provision. Although very different than the approach of
other circuits, this interpretation also favors the relator.
In United States ex rel. S. Prawer& Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, the First
Circuit noted that the phrase "allegations or transactions" is ambiguous, and
therefore, courts must look at the entire statute and the history of its
141. United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sci., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir. 1996).
142. United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 935
(6th Cir. 1997).
143. United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562,
568 (1lth Cir. 1994).
144. Id. (citing PrecisionCo., 971 F.2d at 552).
145. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol17/iss1/6

20

Metnick: The Jurisdictional Bar Provision: Who Is an Appropriate Relator?

2008]

The Jurisdictional Bar Provision

enactment to understand congressional intent. 46 The First Circuit reviewed
circumstances that the jurisdictional bar provision seeks to avoid:
"circumstances involving 'parasitic' qui tam actions."
[W]hen it is not clear whether or not a qui tam action should be barred by
the ambiguous provision precluding the action if it is "based upon
transactions or allegations which are the subject of" another suit or
proceeding in which the government is a party, we think that a court
should look first to whether the two cases can properly be viewed as
having the qualities of a host/parasite relationship.
To determine whether a "parasitic" relationship exists between a qui tam
action and another suit in which the government is a party, the court
considered whether the qui tam case receives "support, advantage or the
' 48
like" from the original case "without giving any useful or proper return."'
If support is provided without a "useful or proper return," then there is an
identity between the basis of the qui tam action and the subject of the other
action. 49 The court concluded that what is a "useful or proper return"
should be determined on a case-by-case basis.1 50 In concluding that the qui
tam action at issue resulted in a "useful or proper return," the court noted
that the action sought recovery for fraud that had not yet been the subject of
an action by the government and had the potential 15to restore money to the
public that would not have otherwise been restored. 1
As such, we do not think that (the action] can be characterized as
"parasitic." Therefore, we believe that it would undermine the purposes
of the 1986 amendments to construe this action as being "based upon
allegations
or transactions which are the subject of' the Collection
152
case.

In United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., the Second Circuit also
examined whether a relator's argument was based upon publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions.15 3 The relator, an attorney, claimed that his
action was based upon allegations he had learned while representing his
client. 54 The allegations were that John Doe Corp. had committed fraud by
146. United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Me., 24 F.3d 320, 326 (1st
Cir. 1994).
147. Id. at 327.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 328.
150. Id.
151. S. Prawer& Co., 24 F.3d at 329.
152. Id.
153. United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1992).
154. Id. at 319.
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overcharging the government for defense contracts. 155 However, the court
held that the "allegations in [the] complaint [were] the same as those that
had been publicly disclosed prior to the filing of the qui tam suit.' ' 56 The
court stated that the same allegations that had previously been published
would divert the court's jurisdiction regardless of the source of the relator's
information.1 57 Ultimately, the court held that the attorney's complaint was
jurisdictionally barred. 58 However, although the court found that the
disclosure by the federal investigators to John Doe's employees constituted
an allegation or transaction, the court did not analyze the significance of the
language "allegations or transactions" in its written opinion. It is not clear
whether this was because the statements made to the employees were
unproven and oral in nature. Perhaps, the court believed that there was no
reason to consider the statements anything other than allegations.
In United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also considered the meaning of "allegations
or transactions."' 59 In Springfield, a company brought a qui tam action
60
against an arbitrator with whom it had been involved in earlier litigation.
The qui tam complaint alleged that the arbitrator fraudulently billed the
government for his services when, in fact, he had not actually performed
arbitration services on that day.' 61 During the arbitration, the company
obtained copies of the arbitrator's pay vouchers and discovered the
fraudulent billing. 162 The company also obtained the arbitrator's telephone
records for the day in question and discovered that the arbitrator had
attended a three-day conference in Canada during the period for which he
billed the government for services rendered. 63 The D.C. Circuit Court
noted that "the Act bars suits based on publicly disclosed 'allegations or
transactions,' not information."'164 The court based this finding on the plain
meaning of the terms and its interpretation of the FCA.165 The opinion
suggested an algebraic framework by which the issue of what constitutes a
relevant allegation or transaction under the FCA could be determined:

155. Id. at 320.
156. Id. at 324.
157. Id.
158. Doe, 960 F.2d at 324.
159. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 65354 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 648.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 648
165. Id. at 653.
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[I]n common parlance, the term "allegation" connotes a conclusory
statement implying the existence of provable supporting facts.... The
term "transaction" suggests an exchange between two parties or things
that reciprocally affect or influence one another .... On the basis of plain

meaning... if X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud and X and
Y represent its essential elements. In order to disclose the fraudulent
transactionpublicly, the combination of X and Y must be revealed, from
which readers or listeners may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that fraud has
been committed. The language employed in § 3730(e)(4)(A) suggests
that Congress sought to prohibit qui tam actions only when either the
allegation of fraud or the critical elements of the fraudulent transaction
themselves were in the public domain. 166

Accordingly, the court held that the information disclosed during discovery
did not rise to the level of "allegations or transactions" so as to bar
jurisdiction.167 Thus, the court provided a very narrow interpretation of the
"allegations or transactions" condition of the general exclusion.16R
IV. ORIGINAL SOURCE EXCEPTION

"Even if the first prong of the jurisdictional bar provision is met and the
qui tam lawsuit is 'based upon' publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions," the qui tam plaintiff is not jurisdictionally barred if he or she
is the "original source" of the information.1 69 An "original source" is
defined in the statute as "an individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing 1an
70
action under this section which is based on the information."
Controversies identified by legal scholars pertaining to the "original source"
element of the jurisdictional bar provision include: "(1) the interpretation of
'direct and independent'; (2) whether the qui tam plaintiff had to disclose
information to the source that publicly disclosed the information in order to
qualify as an 'original source'; and (3) the 171
definition of the phrase
based."
are
allegations
the
which
on
"information

166.

Id. at 653-54.

167. Id. at 655.
168. E.g., United States ex rel. Found. Aiding the Elderly v. Horizon West Inc., 265
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
169. FABRIKANT, supra note 54, § 4, at 42.
170. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
171.

FABRIKANT, supra note 54, § 4, at 42.
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A. Interpretationsof the "Directand Independent" Condition of the
OriginalSource Exception
The key factors regarding a qui tam plaintiff's qualification as an original
source and whether the plaintiff obtained the information 'directly and
independently' are "[t]he specificity and uniqueness of the information and
the manner and timing in which the qui tam plaintiff obtained the
information."' 172 In United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries,
173
Inc., the Tenth Circuit ruled that Precision was not an original source.
The court noted that Precision Company's claim was based on three
categories of information: information gathered by William Koch, a major
shareholder of Precision who participated in previous Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") suits; information gathered by
William Presley, President of Precision, from January to June of 1988; and
information gathered by William Presley after July of 1988.'74 Having
reviewed the information under the "based upon" test, the court found that
neither Koch nor Presley could be the plaintiff of the qui tam suit.

75

Moreover, the court concluded that Precision was not the original source
because Precision did not exist as a corporate entity until June 1988 and
Precision made no showing that it was legitimately entitled to the
information prior to its formation as an entity. 76 The court found that the
remaining information gathered by Precision (an affidavit, nineteen
unsworn statements, and interview summaries) was "best characterized as a
continuation of, or derived from Mr. Presley's and Mr. Koch's individual
177
investigations," and as "weak, informal and strikingly redundant.'
Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff, Precision Co., had not
obtained the information directly and independently.
In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that an employee was the
"original source" of information where he had direct and independent
knowledge of the wrongdoing. 178 Cooper was over the age of sixty-five but
remained employed with the U.S. Census Bureau, and as a "working aged,"
Cooper qualified for both Medicare and federal benefits through Blue Cross

172. FABRIKANT, supra note 54, § 4, at 43.
173. United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 554 (10th
Cir. 1992).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 553-54.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562,
568 (1lth Cir. 1994).
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and Blue Shield of Florida ("BCBSF"). 179 Because of his status as a
"working aged," Medicare Secondary Payer laws required BCBSF, as
Cooper's primary insurer, to first make payments on claims before sending
the balance to Medicare. 180 Yet, Medicare ended up paying most of
Cooper's medical bills, as BCBSF returned claims to Cooper with a note
that Medicare must pay first. 181 Cooper instituted a qui tam action under
the FCA, claiming that BCBSF committed fraud against the U.S.
Government
by submitting claims to Medicare without making the first
82
payment. 1

The Eleventh Circuit considered whether Cooper was the original source
of the qui tam suit allegations.' 8 3 The court concluded that Cooper's
knowledge was direct, reasoning that Copper acquired information
regarding BCBSF's wrongdoing through three years of his own claims
processing, research and correspondence with members of Congress and the
Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"). 184
Cooper had
specifically asked HCFA to investigate BCBSF's claims processing. 85 The
86
court further held that Cooper's knowledge was obtained independently.'
Furthermore, the court described Cooper's information as "specific, direct
evidence of fraudulent activity by BCBSF ...Cooper's information is more

than background information which enables him to understand the
significance of a more general public disclosure.
It is 'direct' and
87
'independent' within the meaning of the FCA."1
Yet, in Hays v. Hoffman, the Eighth Circuit found that a qui tam plaintiff
did not have direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
most of the allegations were based, and, as a result, was not the original
source of the information.188 Hays, a former employee of St. Francis Health
Services of Morris, Inc. ("SFHS"), argued that he was the original source of
the information because his letters to the Department of Human Services
("DHS") precipitated the DHS investigation.' 8 9 The Eighth Circuit disagreed
with this argument, referred to as the catalyst theory, stating that "'direct'
190
knowledge is knowledge 'marked by the absence of an intervening agency.""
179.

Id. at 564.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 564-65.
Cooper, 19 F.3d at 565.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 896, 990.
Id. (citing United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th
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The court found that Hays was the original source of only one out of the
eleven allegations. 191 Hays was the original source of the allegation that
SFHS had been claiming apples, given as gifts to SFHS employees, as a
Medicaid-reimbursable food expense.1 92 This allegation was confirmed by
DHS in its investigation. 193 However, Hays failed to establish that he was
an original source of any of the other claims. 194 In fact, the court found that
"most of the other claims were not volunteered by Hays in his
' 95
whistleblower letters to DHS."'
As to the other claims, Hays argued that "he was a 'close observer' of the
information provided because he obtained that information from SFHS's
former finance director who was himself unwilling to come forward as a
whistleblower.' ', 96 Yet, the court opined that such knowledge was neither
direct nor independent. 197 "[A] person who obtains secondhand information
from an individual who has direct knowledge of the alleged fraud does not
1 98
himself possess direct knowledge and therefore is not an original source."
"[T]o be independent, the relator's knowledge must not be derivative of the
information of others, even if those others may qualify as original
sources." 199 As such, the court concluded that Hays was only the original
source of the apples allegation. °°
B. Different Approaches to What is Necessaryfor Adequate Disclosure
In order to qualify for the original source exception, a relator must not
only be the "original source," but the relator's disclosure must also be
adequate. The circuit courts, however, diverge substantially over what is
needed for adequate disclosure. The Second and Ninth Circuits have
interpreted this requirement narrowly while the Fourth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits have taken a broad approach.20 '
The Second Circuit has interpreted the original source exception
narrowly, finding that to qualify as an original source, a relator must
Cir. 1995)).
191. Id. at 990.
192. Id.
193. Hays, 325 F.3d at 990.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 990-91.
197. Id. at 991.
198. Hays, 325 F.3d at 990 (quoting United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc.,
44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995)).
199. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sci., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1007
(IOth Cir. 1996)).
200. Id. at 991.
201.
FABRIKANT, supra note 54, § 4, at 44.
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demonstrate that he revealed the information to the entity that publicly
disclosed it. 20 2 In United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were jurisdictionally barred from
bringing a qui tam action because they were not the original source of the
publicly disclosed information on which their suit was based.2 °3 Plaintiffs
were engineers who worked as mid-level managers at a nuclear power
station.20 4 Through their work at the power station, they were aware of the
station's construction status.20 5
Specifically, plaintiffs learned that Long Island Lighting Co. ("LILCO")
"had lied to the state's Public Service Commission about the construction
status of' the nuclear power station "thereby obtaining higher rates and
defrauding the United States as a ratepayer., 20 6 Sixteen months prior to the
filing of the qui tam action, the county filed a suit against the LILCO,
claiming it violated RICO on rate overcharges.20 7 The county's RICO
action was widely reported in the news media.20 8 The later qui tam action
filed by plaintiffs included allegations set forth in the RICO action.20 9
However, the plaintiffs did not provide the county with the information for
the RICO action. 210 Rather, the RICO complaint was based on information
derived from the county's independent investigation of possible
wrongdoing by LILCO.2 1 1
The Second Circuit noted that to be an original source, a qui tam plaintiff
must (1) have direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and (2) have voluntarily provided such
information to the government prior to filing suit.2 12 Moreover, the court

added that:
A close textual analysis combined with a review of the legislative history
convinces us that under §3730(e)(4)(A) there is an additional requirement
that a qui tam plaintiff must meet in order to be considered an "original
source," namely, a plaintiff also must have directly or indirectly been a

202.

United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir.

1990).
203.

Id. at 18.

204.

Id. at 14.

205.
206.

Id.
Id.

207.

Dick, 912 F.2d at 14.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.

212.

Dick, 912 F.2d at 16.
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source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which as
suit is based.2t 3
In this case, plaintiffs were not government sources who ultimately placed
the information in the public domain. The court held that if information on
which a qui tam suit was based is in the public domain, and the qui tam
plaintiff was not a source of that information, then the suit must be
barred.21 4 In holding that the plaintiffs were not the original source, the
court reasoned that the county's original
complaint did not rely on
21 5
plaintiffs.
the
by
disclosed
information
In Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., a mechanical
engineer brought a qui tam action against his former employer, FMC Corp.,
claiming that it defrauded the government through its performance of
certain defense contracts.2 16 One issue considered by the court was whether
a relator was required to be the one who disclosed the information
originally if the suit was brought after the allegation had already been made
public. 17 Wang had been part of the team of FMC engineers who studied
the problem related to the fraudulent performance of the defense contract
and had personally written the report, which outlined the problem and
recommended further research. g The court concluded that "Wang had
personal knowledge of the ... problems because he worked.. , on trying to
fix them. ' ' 21 9 "Wang's knowledge of the.., problems was 'direct and
independent' because it was unmediated by anything but Wang's own
220
labor.,
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit's holding in Dick that a
qui tam plaintiff "must have directly or indirectly been a source to the entity
that publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is based., 22 1 The
Ninth Circuit added, however, that to bring a qui tam suit, "one must have
had a hand in the public disclosure of allegations that are part of one's
suit. '222 The court held that because Wang had no hand in the original
public disclosure of the transmission troubles, his qui tam claim did not

213.

Id.

214.
215.

Id. at 18.
Id.

216.

Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th

Cir. 1992).
217. Id.
218.

Id. at 1417.

219.
220.

Id.
Id.

221. Chen-Cheng Wang, 975 F.2d at 1416 (quoting United States ex rel. Dick v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990)).
222. Id. at 1418.
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qualify for the original source exception and was therefore barred by the
jurisdictional bar provision.22 3 The court reasoned that although Wang
knew of the transmission problems, he was silent and failed to bring them
to the attention of the government or media.2 24
He sat quietly in the shadows and breathed not a word about them until
he was fired. While Wang was silent, some other conscientious or
enterprising person bravely brought the transmission problems to the
attention of the media and the Army. If there is to be a bounty for
it should go to the one who in fact helped to
disclosing these troubles,
225
bring them to light.
In United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., the Fourth
Circuit took a very different view from the Ninth and Second Circuits.2 26 In
Siller, an employee of Scientific Supply, Inc ("SSI"), a former distributor of
Becton Dickinson ("BD"), brought a qui tam action against BD, alleging
that BD overcharged the government. SSI had previously sued BD,
alleging wrongful termination of its distributorship agreement, claiming BD
ended the agreement because it feared that SSI would disclose BD's
practice of overcharging the government.227 SSI's lawsuit was resolved
when SSI and BD entering into a confidential settlement agreement.228
Within fifteen months of the settlement, Siller filed a qui tam action
against BD. 229 However, the trial court found that Siller's action was
precluded by the jurisdictional bar provision because it was "based upon"
the prior public disclosure of allegations that BD overcharged the
government which appeared in SSI's lawsuit against BD.23 ° On appeal, the
court then considered whether Siller had adequately made a disclosure as an
original source. 23 1 This court challenged the Second Circuit's requirement:
[T]he provision unambiguously does not require, as the Second Circuit
has held that it does, that a relator be a source to the original disclosing
entity in order to be an "original source." Rather, it requires only that the
relator have direct and independent knowledge of the information

223. Id. at 1420.
224. Id. at 1419.
225. Id. at 1419-20.
226. United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1339 (4th
Cir. 1994).
227. Id. at 1340-41.
228. Id. at 1341.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1342.
231. Siller. 21 F.3d at 1351.
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underlying the .....
allegations of a false claim and voluntarily provide
the
232
information to the government before filing his qui tam action.
In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the Second
Circuit's holding in Dick that a relator must demonstrate the he was the
original source to the entity that disclosed the information.23 3 Rather, the
Eleventh Circuit held that "[r]elators under the FCA are required
to bring
234
their allegations to the government's attention before filing suit.
C. Rockwell has Ended the Dispute Over "Informationon which the
Allegations are Based"
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's March 2007 decision in
Rockwell InternationalCorp. v. United States, the circuits were split over
the meaning of "information on which the allegations are based." One of
the conditions of the original source exception requires individuals who
bring qui tam actions to have independent and direct knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based.235 The Third, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits took the position that the phrase referred to the allegations in
the relator's qui tam complaint, while the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
D.C. Circuits held that the phrase referred to information on which the
publicly disclosed allegations are based.236 In Rockwell the Supreme Court
adopted the position of the Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, affirming that
the phrase "'information on which the allegations are based' refers to
knowledge of the actual facts underlying the allegations on which the
whistleblower may ultimately prevail and not the information underlying
237
the publicly disclosed allegations.
In Rockwell, one of the issues considered by the Court was whether the

232. Id.
233. United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562,
568 (11 th Cir. 1994).
234. Id.
235. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2000).
236. See United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336
F.3d 346, 353-55 (5th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech.,
Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency
Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v.
Housing Auth., 186 F.3d 376, 388 (3d Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPCBoron Employee's Club, 105 F.3d 675, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Barajas v.
Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
237.

Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court: More Scrutiny Required in Whistleblower Claims,

NAT'L L.J., Apr. 2,
id= 175763838772.
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relator, James Stone, was an original source.
Rockwell International
Corp. ("Rockwell") ran Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado
under a contract with the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE").23 9 James
Stone worked as an engineer at Rocky Flats and explored the possibility of
disposing toxic pond sludge that accumulated in solar evaporation ponds at
the facility by mixing it with cement. 240 The plan was to pour the mixture
into large rectangular boxes where it could solidify into "pondcrete" blocks
to be stored onsite or transported to other sites for disposal. 241 Having
reviewed the pondcrete process, Stone concluded that it "would not work"
and conveyed his opinion to Rockwell management in writing, predicting
the pondcrete would fail.242 Stone believed that the process "would result in
an unstable mixture that would later deteriorate
and cause an unwanted
2 43
release of toxic wastes to the environment.
Notwithstanding Stone's recommendation, Rockwell proceeded with the
pondcrete project.2 44 Stone was laid off in March 1986, and later that year,
Rockwell discovered that a number of pondcrete blocks were insolid.245
The DOE eventually learned of the problem in 1988.246 In 1987, however,
Stone provided the FBI with information pertaining to environmental
crimes committed by Rocky Flats.247 Based on information from Stone, the
FBI obtained a search warrant and raided Rocky Flats in June 1989.248
Newspapers published the allegations.249 In July 1989, Stone filed a FCA
qui tam lawsuit against Rockwell, alleging that the company violated
environmental and safety issues and knowingly presented false and
fraudulent claims to the government in order to induce payments.250
Stone's statement to the government described his review of the
pondcrete system and his prediction that the piping mechanism would fail
and lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge and cement.2 5'
The
government intervened and an amended complaint was filed, alleging that

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. U.S., 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1405 (2007).
Id. at 1401.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1401-02.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1402.
Id. at 1403.

250.
251.

Id.
Id.
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Rockwell stored leaky pondcrete blocks.252 The complaint did not allege
that Stone had predicted a defect in the piping system causing the insolid
concrete. 3 Stone and the government clarified their position further in a
statement of claims which stated that pondcrete's insolidity was due to "an
incorrect cement/sludge ratio used in pondcrete operations, as well as due to
inadequate process controls and inadequate inspection procedures. 2 54
At trial, Stone and the government did not argue that the defect in the
piping system had been predicted by Stone and caused the insolid
pondcrete. 2 " Rather, they argued that "the pondcrete failed because
Rockwell's new foreman used an insufficient
cement-to-sludge ratio in an
25 6
effort to increase pondcrete production.,
Before determining whether Stone had "direct and independent
knowledge," the Court first considered the meaning of the phrase
"information on which the allegations are based." The Court concluded that
the phrase refers to the information upon which the relator's allegations are
based and not the publicly disclosed allegations. 257 The Court reasoned that
the plain language of subparagraph (B) of the jurisdictional bar provision
suggested this result.25 8

Moreover, the Court concluded that "[t]o bar a

relator with direct and independent knowledge of information underlying
his allegations just because no one can know what information underlies the
similar allegations of some other person simply makes no sense. 259
The Court held that Stone's prediction that the pondcrete would be
insolid due to a flaw in the piping system did not qualify as "direct and
independent knowledge" of the defect. 260 The Court reasoned that Stone
lacked knowledge because he did not know for certain that the pondcrete
would fail. 26 1 Rather, the Court stated "[e]ven if a prediction can qualify as
direct and independent knowledge in some cases.

. .

do so when its premise of cause and effect is wrong.

, it assuredly does not

262

V. CONCLUSION

Although the United States Supreme Court has provided some much

252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 1404.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1404.
Id.
Id.

256.
257.

Id.
Id. at 1407.
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Rockwell Int'l Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1407.
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needed clarification on the issue of the "direct and independent knowledge"
needed to satisfy the original source exception, much of the language in the
jurisdictional bar provision remains unclear. Whether a relator will proceed
beyond the jurisdictional bar depends significantly on the circuit in which
he files the qui tam suit. In deciding whether to bar a relator, the various
courts determine whether the information alleged in the suit was publicly
disclosed and if so, whether the qui tam plaintiff was the original source of
the information.
When analyzing the jurisdictional bar provision, it is generally best for a
relator to file suit in a circuit with a narrow interpretation of "public
disclosure" to avoid barring of the claim. The Ninth Circuit generally
remains a good jurisdiction for a relator in requiring actual disclosure while
the Third Circuit holds that the mere potential for public disclosure satisfies
the jurisdictional bar provision. On the other hand, the Third Circuit
requires that information originate in a forum specifically listed in the
jurisdictional bar provision; however, its interpretation of "hearing" is so
expansive that no benefit is offered to the relator. Moreover, the Third
Circuit case, Mistick, also requires that "public disclosure" be in the form of
The Third Circuit also interprets
an "allegation" or "transaction."
"allegations or transactions" broadly such that it essentially has no
significance in the jurisdictional bar provision. Consequently, the Third
Circuit remains a difficult jurisdiction for a relator to bring a qui tam suit
under the FCA.
In Rockwell, the United States Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
"information," as used in §3730(e)(4)(B) of the United States Code, but
failed to address the other components of the original source exception
which require a relator to voluntarily provide the information to the
government before filing his action and have direct and independent
knowledge. Despite some clarification, the circuits remain split over the
meaning of original source. They also remain split over the significance of
public disclosure.
With so many points of controversy, Congress must revise the
jurisdictional bar provision to offer some guidance on the ambiguous terms
and nebulous phrases which haunt this important statutory pitfall. Given
the increase in importance of qui tam litigation in fighting healthcare fraud
and abuse, it is crucial that FCA litigants and their counsel are well
informed of the highly contested language in the jurisdictional bar provision
and the arbitrary results which may be produced, depending on where suit is
filed. A thorough evaluation of the law in any circuit will improve a
relator's chance of success in the action.
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